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1. Introduction 
Because few would object to evidence-based medicine’s (EBM) principal task of basing 
medical decisionmaking on the most judicious and up-to-date evidence, the debate over this 
prolific movement may seem puzzling. Who, one may ask, could be against evidence (Carr-
Hill, 2006)? Yet this question belies the sophistication of the evidence-based movement. This 
chapter presents the evidence-based approach as a socio-medical phenomenon and seeks to 
explain and negotiate the points of disagreement between supporters and detractors. This is 
done by casting EBM as more than the simple application of research findings to clinical 
care and improved health outcomes, but rather an umbrella term that harnesses a specific 
set of pedagogical objectives (some rather radical) under a name that makes it difficult to 
argue against.  
EBM is most popularly defined as the “conscientious and judicious use of current best 
evidence in the healthcare of individuals and populations” (Sackett et al., 1996b). EBM’s 
influential doctrine first appeared in the Journal of the American Medical Association as a brief 
polemic authored by the Evidence Based Medicine Working Group: 
A new paradigm for medical practice is emerging. Evidence based medicine de-emphasizes 
intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, and pathophysiologic rationale as sufficient grounds 
for clinical decision-making and stresses the examination of evidence from clinical research. 
EBM requires new skills of the physician, including efficient literature searching and the 
application of the formal rules of evidence (Evidence Based Medicine Working Group 
[EBMWG], 1992). 
EBM rose quickly into prominence in medicine, with virtually every area of healthcare now 
subscribing to the evidence based mantra. This is a considerable feat for a discipline that is 
described in the EBM manifesto as largely reliant on conventions and habits of thought and 
practice. 
Yet amidst the hubris, there is a sort of obviousness to EBM that has prompted critics to 
charge EBM with offering “nothing new” (Benitez-Bribiesca, 1999): 
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“Evidence based medicine,” one chemist said to me, “What other kind of medicine could there 
possibly be?” and a consultant physician said gruffly: “We have always practiced evidence based 
medicine” (Hope, 1995).1 
The EBM pioneers equivocated on the movement’s innovation and conservatism. It was 
described as both a “new paradigm” (EBMWG, 1992) and a historically-supported approach 
“whose philosophical origins extend back to mid-19th century Paris and earlier” (Sackett et 
al., 1996b). Yet it will be demonstrated in this chapter that although EBM is not best 
understood as a new “paradigm” or a radical departure from biomedicine, it offers 
methodological innovation that has shifted how we pursue, collect, and evaluate medical 
knowledge. 
Beginning with a historical account of the origins of EBM, a focus on three key 
methodological innovations employed by EBM will be used to advance the argument that 
EBM’s original contribution to medicine, or what separates EBM from other approaches, is 
the priority it gives to certain forms of evidence, specifically evidence from randomized 
controlled trials. EBM offers a shift in the sort of evidence that is most highly valued for 
diagnosis, therapy, and prognosis questions, as heavy emphasis is placed on experimental 
controls and quantified measures, thus diminishing the previous status of clinical 
experience and observational studies significantly. This commitment represents not only 
methodological change, but also a novel regard of the reliability of various forms of medical 
knowledge. EBM offers a new answer to medicine’s fundamental normative question: how 
ought we to practice medicine? 
2. The origins of evidence-based medicine 
The origins of the evidence-based medicine movement are traceable back to a series of 
lectures given by epidemiologist Archie Cochrane in the early 1970s, where he argued that 
many popularly used medical practices were of unknown or questionable safety and 
efficacy (Ashcroft, 2004). In these lectures, which were later compiled in Effectiveness and 
Efficiency: Random Reflections on Health Services (Cochrane, 1972), he detailed the injury, 
waste, and failure to improve care that ensued from widespread acceptance and use of 
unestablished medical interventions. He maintained that treatments should be evaluated 
using unbiased methods like the randomized controlled trial, and that health care 
professionals should regularly update their knowledge base (Ashcroft, 2004). Aschcroft has 
noted the strong ethical imperative behind Cochrane’s recommendations, as they were 
rooted in concern to do no harm, to do one’s best for one’s patients, and to do so justly by 
eliminating waste (Ashcroft, 2004).  
Cochrane’s programmatic outline was revitalized in 1990 by a group of professors of clinical 
epidemiology, medical informatics, and biostatistics at McMaster University in Canada, 
who called themselves the “Evidence Based Medicine Working Group”. They introduced 
the phrase “Evidence Based Medicine” in a ubiquitous 1992 manifesto as a “new paradigm” 
in medical education and practice (EBMWG, 1992). In the document, the ethical promise 
was made that the virtuous clinician “whose practice is based on an understanding of the 
                                                 
1 Hope is a supporter of EBM who maintains that one sign of a movement being important is when its 
detractors indignantly maintain that it is nothing new.  
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underlying evidence will provide superior patient care” (EBMWG, 1992). While the ethical 
imperative to improve patient care remained central, the promise to decrease medical 
uncertainty by systematic evaluation of the efficacy of current practices was particularly 
appealing to health care administrators and policy analysts facing a crisis situation with 
respect to escalating healthcare costs and spending. Added to the gamut of methodologies 
for data collection and analysis first recommended by Cochrane was the use of emerging 
information technologies to synthesize the large quantities of published studies, proliferate 
information, and increase accessibility. The combined picture of EBM as ethically driven to 
improve patient care, fiscally responsible, and technologically up-to-date likely drove the 
rapid integration of the movement into medicine, where just over twenty years since the 
Evidence Based Medicine Working Group formed, EBM is now common parlance within 
health care. Academic centres and journals dedicated to EBM’s advancement have been 
established with much fanfare, and the evidence-based movement has stretched beyond the 
health sciences to business management (Kovner et al., 2000; Kovner & Rundall, 2006), 
public health (McGuire, 2005), speech pathology (Reilly et al., 2004), occupational therapy 
(Von Zweck, 1999) social work (Cournoyer, 2004; Howard et al., 2003; Grinnell & Unrau, 
2010), education (Council for Exceptional Children, 2011; Horner et al., 2005; Slavin, 2002), 
and other social science disciplines. It is even generating attention as a promising new 
approach to bioethics (“evidence-based ethics”) (Roberts, 2000; Strech, 2008; the rare 
criticism is found in Goldenberg, 2005). The term “evidence-based everything” has been 
used to describe the enthusiasm for this movement (Mykhalovskiy & Weir, 2004). 
3. What’s new about EBM?  
Despite the fanfare, it is not immediately obvious that EBM offers something new to medical 
practice. In response to EBM’s demand that medical decisions ought to be based on 
stringent empirical evidence, critics ask, hasn’t modern medicine always been evidence-
based? Quite surely, by being founded on natural science, biomedicine has always been 
grounded in the empirical sciences, which bases its claims on observational evidence. 
The critics are correct to think that EBM’s empirical commitments are not new to medicine’s 
ideal practices (regardless of whether or not they are actually practiced). However, 
proponents have denied the charge that EBM is “old hat” (Sackett et al., 1996b), and have 
even been grandiose in their descriptions of EBM as being a “new paradigm” promising to 
“revolutionize” medicine (EBMWG, 1992). This description suggests the evidence based 
approach to offer something radically different from previous approaches, and so it is worth 
investigating this alleged paradigm change.  
3.1 Is EBM a new paradigm? 
To illustrate the unique workings of EBM, the new paradigm of medicine, the Evidence 
Based Medicine Working Group presented the following clinical scenario: 
A junior medical resident working in a teaching hospital admits a 43-year old previously well 
man who experiences a witnessed grand mal seizure. He had never had a seizure before and had 
not had any recent head trauma…Findings on physical examination are normal. The patient is 
given a loading dose of phenytoin intravenously and the drug is continued orally. A computed 
tomographic head scan is completely normal, and an electroencephalogram shows only non-
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specific findings. The patient is very concerned about his risk of seizure recurrence. How might 
the resident proceed (EBMWG, 1992)? 
The Working Group explain that the resident practicing “the way of the past” (pre-EBM) would 
consult the senior resident, who, supported in his view by the attending physician, informs her 
that the risk of seizure recurrence is high, although its precise risk factor is unknown to him. 
He instructs the resident to relay this information and the related precautions to the patient. 
The resident does as she is told and the patient, still fearful, is discharged (EBMWG, 1992). In 
“the way of the future”, however, the EBM-trained resident asks herself whether she knows the 
prognosis of a first seizure and, realizing that she does not, proceeds to the library and 
conducts a literature search on the Grateful Med (now PubMed) search engine. Her search on 
the medical subject headings “epilepsy”, “prognosis”, and “recurrence” retrieves twenty-five 
titles, of which one is deemed by the resident to be directly relevant. Exercising the critical 
appraisal skills that she learned in medical school, she reviews the paper, deems the study and 
its conclusions to be valid, and returns to her patient after only thirty minutes. She conveys the 
risk of recurrence over time post-incident, and recommends follow-up with his family 
physician. The patient leaves “with a clear idea of his likely prognosis” (EBMWG, 1992). 
In their comparative analysis of EBM and its biomedical predecessor, Sehon and Stanley 
argue that the EBM programmatic literature’s likening of its approach to a Kuhnian 
paradigm shift is a gross exaggeration (Sehon & Stanley, 2003). The authors contend that 
EBM is not a new paradigm because Kuhn described such a large-scale scientific revolution 
as involving dramatic changes of worldview and even a different world in which scientists 
must operate (Kuhn, 1996). A Kuhnian paradigm is an “entire constellation of beliefs, 
values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community” (Kuhn, 1996). 
The new paradigm will be incommensurable, to some extent, with the previous paradigm, a 
condition that is not met with the evidence based approach in comparison to biomedicine’s 
“basic science approach”, which involves “studying the physiological mechanisms of the 
body and the biochemical properties of drugs” (Sehon & Stanley, 2003).  
When EBM is suggested to be a new paradigm, this fosters the impression that an entire set 
of beliefs, values, and techniques are being discarded, “and that the whole world of medical 
research and clinical practice is completely different than it was in the days before EBM” 
(Sehon & Stanley, 2003). This impression is certainly false. Furthermore, the language of 
paradigms suggests that health care practitioners must make a “stark choice” between EBM 
and “traditional” biomedicine, where one can “accept the new regime and completely reject 
the old, or defensively hold onto the old and dismiss EBM entirely” (Sehon & Stanley, 2003). 
Aside from not being a productive atmosphere in which to hold a critical debate about EBM, 
this polarization exaggerates the merits, demerits, and differences between EBM and its 
biomedical “predecessor”. 
Numerous commentators have characterized the EBM debate as dredging up the hoary “art 
versus science” dispute regarding the nature of modern clinical medicine. The critics worry 
that EBM overemphasizes the latter at the expense of the former. Sullivan and 
MacNaughton, for example, comment that  
the doctor does not deal with illnesses alone but with people who are ill, and for each individual 
the illness is unique in terms of his or her experience of it and in its presentation to the doctor 
(Sullivan & MacNaughton, 1996). 
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Understanding the unique circumstances of the individual case is thought to involve a form of 
practical knowledge or judgment quite different from the technical knowledge offered by EBM. 
The “grey zones” of practice (Naylor, 1995), that is, areas where the evidence from randomized 
trials about risk-benefit ratios of competing clinical options is incomplete, inconclusive, or 
contradictory and so clinical judgment must be relied on,2 are repeatedly argued to be missing 
from EBM’s formulaic knowledge base (Tanenbaum, 1993). Indeed, EBM struggles to account 
for the interpretive dimensions of clinical care, as evidence-based decisionmaking is largely an 
effort to standardize and rationalize the application of evidence to clinical care. It is no wonder 
that critics fail to be persuaded by EBM’s conciliatory efforts, such as making the first principle 
of EBM “evidence is never enough” in the authoritative Users’ Guides to the Medical Literature 
textbook (Guyatt & Rennie, 2002). It is also worth asking: if evidence is not the fundamental 
base of medicine, are we still practicing evidence based medicine? 
In light of these grey zones, EBM is charged with creating and sustaining the idea that 
evidence and practice are opposing concepts (Pope 2003; Wood et al., 1998). Other dualisms 
reinforced in the EBM literature include technical vs. experiential/intuitive knowledge, 
empirical vs. theoretical knowledge, evidence based vs. patient-centred care, and, of course, 
EBM vs. its biomedical predecessor, which is inappropriately referred to as “traditional 
medicine”.3 Adherence to these artificial bifurcations seems to misdirect the EBM debate, as 
they promote undue polarization between EBM and its biomedical alternatives. For 
instance, the references to pre-EBM as “traditional medicine” in some of the early EBM 
programmatic literature (EBMWG, 1992; Sackett et al, 1996b) is an obvious misnomer, as the 
term typically refers to folk and alternative healing practices. The selection of this 
inappropriate term was presumably deliberate, as it permitted the EBM originators to 
emphasize what they alleged to be the widespread tendency of clinical medicine to operate 
without sufficient evidentiary support to establish the efficacy of their practices. Pre-EBM 
biomedicine was therefore “traditional” insofar as it is unscientific or at least insufficiently 
scientific. Some support for this claim has been found in the phenomenon of small area 
variations of healthcare practice among different geographical regions (Parchman, 1995). 
However invoking “traditional medicine” is polemical (and distracting) in its 
misrepresentation of biomedicine, as it cannot account for biomedicine’s modern scientific 
framework, its significant technological advances and achievements, and, of course, EBM’s 
ties to the biomedical tradition. 
Despite not invoking revolution (or comparable large-scale upheaval) in medical practice, it 
will now be demonstrated that EBM brings something new to medicine. The critics who 
deny this claim likely do so because they misunderstand EBM to be asking for no more than 
rigorous empirical research in medicine. But the term “evidence based” amounts to much 
more. While the evidence based approach certainly does call for rigorous empirical research 
in medicine, this call is accompanied by novel accounts of what counts as valid evidence 
                                                 
2 Among the procedures cited by Naylor to be in the “grey zone” are: carotid endarterectomy, upper 
gastrointestinal (GI) endoscopy, hysterectomy, and percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty. 
Randomized controlled trials have been done in these areas, but the results have not produced 
unequivocal conclusions. 
3 Accompanying these imposed bifurcations are, of course, efforts at integration, such as “evidence-
based patient centred care” (Borgmeyer, 2005), and “evidence-based patient choice” (Hope, 1996; 
Edwards & Elwyn, 2001; Parker, 2001). The literature also includes an effort to overcome (or possibly 
deny) the evidence/judgment divide (Downie et al., 2000). 
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and what qualifies as the most rigorous methods of empirical research. Rather than a 
revolution or paradigm change, EBM represents an important shift in biomedical thinking 
and practice that is a significant alternative to its biomedical predecessor. Specifically, EBM 
offers a shift in the sort of evidence that is most highly valued for diagnostics, prognostics, 
and therapeutics, in its emphasis on experimental controls and quantitative research, which 
undermines previous regard of clinical experience and observational studies significantly 
(Sehon & Stanley, 2003). At minimum, this shift is signified by a change from a medical 
model grounded in basic science to a novel statistically-based medicine (Henry, 2006). 
EBM’s hierarchy of evidence is at the service of outcomes research, which uses a cluster of 
statistical and epidemiological methods for analyzing the therapeutic effectiveness of 
clinical interventions (Gifford, 1996). This commitment to highly controlled data and 
methods of statistical analysis that were previously used only for population-based research 
(such as public health) represents not only methodological change, but also a novel regard 
of the reliability of various forms of medical knowledge.  
4. The novel contents of EBM 
The unique content offered to medicine by EBM remains difficult for many to grasp. Hardly 
anyone can disagree with the goal of getting clinicians to make “conscientious, explicit, and 
judicious use of current best evidence” for decisions in patient care. Any expressions of 
doubt about EBM activities are usually greeted with vigorous accusations of disregarding 
“today’s harsh realities”, or ignoring “what happens in clinical medicine” (Sackett et al., 
1996a). Furthermore, critics are frequently denounced for erroneous beliefs that EBM only 
uses evidence from randomized controlled trials, that it involves “merely the mindless 
application of the results of megatrials”, and that “other forms of evidence are heavily 
discounted” (Rosenberg & Donald, 1995). Feinstein and Horwitz have wisely suggested that 
much of the confusion surrounding what EBM actually stands for lies in the distinction 
between the contents of EBM itself and its application in clinical practice. It is only when this 
distinction is blurred that many clinicians claim EBM to offer “nothing new” (Feinstein & 
Horwitz, 1997). Many practitioners have seen little novelty in EBM because they regularly 
assemble evidence, develop clinical judgment, read medical literature, attend medical 
meetings, and have discussions with one another. These activities seem entirely compatible 
with the statement that the practice of EBM consists of “integrating individual clinical 
expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic research” 
(Sackett et al., 1996b). The activities surrounding the practice of EBM also seems fairly 
standard, as the data informing evidence-based practice “is not restricted to randomized 
trials and meta-analyses” (Sackett et al., 1996b). It contains “clinically relevant research, 
often from the basic sciences of medicine” and it includes studies of diagnostic tests, 
prognostic markers, and “the efficacy and safety of the therapeutic, rehabilitative and 
preventive regimes” (Sackett et al., 1996b). With this description of what is done when EBM 
is practiced and with the overt acknowledgement by the EBM originators that EBM is rooted 
in the medical thought of mid-nineteenth century France, specifically “the call for external 
evidence expressed in Paris 150 years ago by Louis, Bichat and Magendie” (Sackett et al., 
1997), clinicians can easily conclude that EBM is not particularly novel, and may wonder 
why it has stirred so much fuss and controversy (Feinstein & Horwitz, 1997). 
The novelty lies, however, in the organization and privileging of information. While a wide 
range of evidentiary sources are permitted in evidence-based practice, the evidence 
collected for EBM itself is confined almost exclusively to RCTs and meta-analyses of those 
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trials. The RCT is consistently ranked at the top of the hierarchy of evidence, thus 
confirming the former’s privileged position (Feinstein & Horwitz, 1997). For instance, 
Sackett et al. maintain that for questions of therapy,  
we should try to avoid the nonexperimental approaches, since they routinely lead to false-positive 
conclusions about efficacy…The randomized trial, and especially the systematic review of several 
randomized trials…has become the “gold standard” (Sackett et al, 1996b, as cited in Feinstein & 
Horwitz, 1997).  
The analysis in the next three sections will further examine the novel contents of EBM 
captured in its methodological privileging of (1) the hierarchy of evidence, (2) the 
randomized controlled trial, and (3) outcomes measures.  
4.1 The hierarchy of evidence 
The hierarchy of evidence captures EBM’s basic methodological and epistemic commitments 
in a fairly straightforward ranking of methods. EBM proponents strongly hold that the 
trustworthiness or validity of evidence is a function of the design of the study from which 
the evidence is obtained (Sackett, 1989, 1997; Sackett et al., 1991; Solomon & McLeod, with 
the Canadian Task Force on the Periodic Health Examination, 1994), and so the desire to use 
only the “best evidence from clinical research” in the management of individual patients 
(Sackett et al, 1996b, 1997) has resulted in intricate classificatory schemes for ranking the 
value of different types of studies. Among the numerous published formulations, there is a 
consistent placement of randomized controlled trials or the systematic review of these trials 
at the top, retrospective studies well down the list, and clinical anecdotes are seen as 
providing little if any evidence for the value of intervention (see Fig. 1).  
A Hierarchy of Strength of Evidence for Treatment Decisions 
 N of 1 randomized controlled trial 
 Systematic reviews of randomized controlled trials 
 Single randomized trial 
 Systematic review of observational studies addressing patient-important outcomes 
 Single observational study addressing patient-important outcomes 
  Physiologic studies (studies addressing blood pressure, cardiac output, exercise 
capacity, bone density, and so forth) 
  Unsystematic clinical observations 
Fig. 1. Users’ Guide to Medical Literature hierarchy of evidence (Rennie & Guyatt, 2002) 
While EBM has evolved over time, most notably in its self-regard from a (polemical) “new 
paradigm” to a more tempered technique for clinicians to manage vast quantities of 
research information (for example, Haynes, 2002), the core belief that evidence belongs in 
fixed hierarchical order with the systematic review of randomized controlled trials always 
on top remains unshaken (Upshur et al., 2001). In the evaluation of treatment effects, for 
example, a large, well-designed, randomized trial is considered more reliable than those 
findings from non-randomized prospective or retrospective studies (Sackett, 1997). 
Similar schemes have been developed for the ranking of evidence in other clinical 
categories such as prognosis, aetiology, and diagnosis (Centre for Evidence-Based 
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Medicine, 2006; Sackett et al., 1997). At the bottom of each of these clinical scales is 
evidence obtained from case reports and personal experience.  
The logic behind the ranking of evidence is simple: randomization is the best method for 
distinguishing between the effects of active treatment from the effects of known and 
unknown potentially biasing influences (Peto & Baigent, 1988). It follows that we should 
make every effort to identify and catalogue these studies. And this is exactly what is 
happening. EBM proponents initially endorsed the teaching of critical analysis skills in 
medical schools so that physicians could properly assess the quality of a study (EBMWG, 
1992). The hierarchy of evidence is one of the tools used in this task. It was quickly 
realized, however, that more advanced informatics were needed in order for clinicians to 
manage the massive amount of research data available. The Cochrane Collaboration has 
undertaken the monumental task of identifying and evaluating well over a million 
randomized controlled trials (U.S. Cochrane Center, 2002). Systematic reviews and meta-
analyses of randomized trials in specific areas of medicine are now widely available on 
EBM databases and in EBM journals.  
The privileging of “hard” evidence—the quantified data generated by randomized controlled 
trials—over knowledge generated from clinical experience (EBMWG, 1992) and qualitative 
measures (Gray, 1997) speaks to an epistemic distrust of subjective or personal experience, 
which cannot guard against biasing influences. Methodologies like blinding, randomization, 
placebo-control, the use of large subject populations, and replication of results serve to abstract 
from values to reveal empirical facts. Of the types of trials available, clinical trials offer the 
strongest and clearest support for any claim that a treatment is effective because they allow 
scientists to control extraneous variables and test one factor at a time (Schick & Vaughn, 2002). 
The hierarchy of evidence is, by the founders’ own admission, based on levels of certainty, 
where the quantified and the scientific forms of evidence are placed on top because they are 
understood to be most resistant to sceptical refutation (Sackett et al., 1991). 
The central goal behind the EBM movement is quality of care, and this goal serves as the 
grounds for encouraging medical practice that utilizes the latest and best evidence. 
Evidence-based practices, including the ranking of evidence, are thought to enhance 
effective and efficient clinical decision-making. But, critics argue, “effectiveness” need not be 
limited to clinical- or cost-effectiveness. It could also refer to patient-based outcomes 
indicating satisfaction with the treatment provided. The hierarchy prioritizes evidence of 
clinical effectiveness and necessarily excludes subjective perceptions (Malterud, 1995, 2001; 
Rogers 2002). Yet patient narratives and the interpretive features of clinical practice are 
thought by many to be crucial features of quality healthcare (Greenhalgh & Hurwitz, 1998; 
Greenhalgh, 1999; Malterud 2001; Silva et al., 2011). 
4.2 Randomized controlled trials: The “gold standard” of medical research 
The methodological debates that make up the bulk of the EBM literature revolve around the 
general question whether or not the refined focus on clinical evidence (as prioritized in the 
EBM hierarchy of knowledge), or the search for secure knowledge in general, improves our 
ability to decipher best practices and therefore prescribe the most effective treatments. 
Alternatively, the methods may leave out too many important features of clinical care that 
are not readily measurable through evidence-based approaches. This leads to the important 
www.intechopen.com
Innovating Medical Knowledge: 
Understanding Evidence-Based Medicine as a Socio-Medical Phenomenon 
 
19 
further question of whether the randomized controlled trial rightfully deserves the title of 
“gold standard”.  
Regarded as a maverick among his peers, Cochrane strongly promoted the controversial view 
that randomized controlled trials offer the best test for the effects of medical interventions and 
could thereby correct ineffectiveness and even harms perpetrated by contemporary medical 
practice (this was another heretical claim) (Pope, 2003). With time, this view came to be 
accepted and randomized trials became “a yardstick by which other sources of information 
were judged and ranked within a hierarchy of evidence” (Pope, 2003). The introduction of 
randomized trials to medical research has been credited by Iain Chalmers, one of the original 
founders of the Cochrane Collaboration who was knighted in 2000 for his activism in 
cumulating evidence in medical research, and others for revolutionizing therapeutic 
development and increasing the life expectancy of patients from three to seven years over the 
past half century (Chalmers, 1998). When substantial uncertainty exists about treatment 
effects, it is widely thought to be not only scientifically correct to answer it in a study with the 
smallest amount of built-in bias, but also most ethical to expose patients to alternative 
treatment options based on chance only and not upon the biased opinion of a physician 
(Edwards et al., 1998; Frazier & Mosteller, 1995; Freedman, 1997; Lilford & Jackson, 1995).  
Many EBM critics point to the “experiential nature” of medical practice for being not only 
inextricable from but also inappropriately maligned by the evidence based approach 
(Tanenbaum 1993; Williams & Garner, 2002). However, supporters of EBM insist that 
experiential knowledge is worth minimizing because experience allows for the repetition of 
mistakes. EBM proponents point to the data available suggesting human fallibility and bias 
in drawing conclusions based on uncontrolled experience (Dawson & Arkes, 1987; 
MacCoun, 1998). Others argue that investigators with relationships or experience with a 
subject form expectations with respect to treatment outcomes that make them less able to 
produce objective reviews of scientific evidence than non-experts trained in critical appraisal 
of evidence (Oxman & Guyatt, 1993). A logical deductive framework for interpretation of 
evidence is therefore argued to be needed if we are to avoid practicing medicine based on 
uncontrolled experience, which may do more harm than good (Sackett, 1989). The nature of 
research is meant to reduce uncertainty, even if it cannot be completely eliminated. Yet what 
randomized controlled trials gain in experimental certainty (internal validity), they lose in 
applicability to the clinical context (external validity) (Cartwright, 2007). The EBM hierarchy 
indicates a strong presumption in favour of internal validity in experimental design. 
The randomized controlled trial design is better geared for certain kinds of intervention 
questions than others. These trials are ideal for the direct comparison between simple 
treatments such as two single drugs, and so the pronounced “hegemony of the double-blind 
randomized controlled trial” (Charlton, 1991) can both undermine research into the use of 
complex interventions and result in a failure to meet the complex needs of individual 
patients. Regarding the former, the critics worry that because randomized controlled trial 
design is increasingly favoured, and because the expectation to provide “best evidence” of 
effectiveness before implementing interventions is growing, complex interventions are by 
default less likely to be supported over time (DeVries & Lemmens, 2006). As a result, 
behavioural, psychosocial, community based, and multiple-component interventions lose 
out in favour of individual patient-based treatments (Dieppe, 1998; Tallon et al., 2000) and 
resultant public health policy-setting increasingly focuses on individuals rather than on 
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groups (Davey-Smith et al., 2001). Speaking more abstractly, numerous philosophers of 
science deny that there is any universal method in science, randomized trial or otherwise 
(Cartwright, 2007; Urbach, 1993; Worrall, 2002).  
In the arena of individual patient care, critics argue that because EBM guidelines are derived 
from controlled trials of simplified clinical situations using criteria that often exclude other 
complicating serious conditions, the evidence may not be applicable to complex clinical 
situations. The “gold standard” of clinical research is widely thought to have a problem of 
generalizability of its results to individual patient care (Britton et al., 1998; Culpepper & 
Gilbert, 1999; Feinstein & Horwitz, 1997). Even Cochrane recognized that while the RCT can 
measure effectiveness, its results may not be directly replicable in clinical practice (Cochrane, 
1972), and so Dingwall et al. seem correct in their suggestion that Cochrane’s ideas have been 
used somewhat selectively in EBM (Dingwall et al., 1988, as cited in Pope, 2003). The problem 
of generalizability begins with the narrow eligibility criteria for randomized trials, which limit 
conclusions about a treatment’s effectiveness to patients who fulfill those criteria (Feinstein & 
Horwitz, 1997). To demonstrate optimal efficacy, randomized controlled trials often use 
relatively homogenous subject populations (Djulbegovic et al., 2000). Patients excluded from 
such trials can differ substantially from study patients in a variety of ways that could influence 
treatment outcomes (i.e. disease severity, comorbid conditions, gender, race) (Britton et al., 
1998; Tanenbaum, 1995). Furthermore, the time periods covered in clinical trials and the 
measures used to assess outcomes frequently differ from those used to assess the success of a 
therapy in actual practice. In an effort to be efficient, clinical trials typically use the shortest 
time possible for determining valid results, employing surrogate endpoints rather than 
clinically relevant outcomes. Surrogate endpoints are physiological or biochemical markers 
that can be ascertained quickly and taken to be predictive of clinically meaningful endpoints—
such as how a patient feels, functions, or survives—that take much longer to observe. They are 
“surrogate” insofar as they are outcome measures that are not of direct practical importance 
but are believed to reflect outcomes that are clinically relevant. For example, cholesterol 
studies frequently use cholesterol reduction as a surrogate for reduced mortality. Direct 
demonstration of mortality reduction requires lengthy trials using large subject populations, 
while cholesterol reduction is known to be strongly associated with mortality benefits, and can 
be measured easily in smaller numbers of patients. Similarly, blood pressure is not directly 
important to patients but it is often used as an outcome in clinical trials because it is a risk 
factor for stroke and heart attacks (Bandolier, n.d.).  
Yet the requirement that surrogate endpoints reliably predict the overall effect of the clinical 
outcome frequently fails in practice (Fleming & DeMets, 1996). The disease process can 
affect the clinical outcome through several causal pathways that are not mediated by the 
surrogate. Therefore the effect of the intervention on these pathways will be different from 
the effect on the surrogate (Fleming & DeMets, 1996). It is more likely, however, that “the 
intervention affects the clinical outcome by unintended, unanticipated, and unrecognized 
mechanisms of action that operate independently of the disease process” (Fleming & 
DeMets, 1996). Fleming and DeMets argue that surrogate endpoints frequently mislead 
regarding the actual effects that treatments have on health outcomes. For instance, although 
lipid levels are widely seen to be important predictors of cardiovascular-related mortality, 
there is debate over the relationship between lipid lowering and reduction in overall 
mortality. The Coronary Drug Project in the 1970’s showed clofibrate and niacin to decrease 
cholesterol levels, however neither agent reduced total mortality (Fleming & DeMets, 1996). 
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Taken together, the numerous controls utilized to guard against bias and promote efficiency 
in medical research limits the relevancy of, and may even distort, the “best evidence from 
clinical research” in the management of individual patients. While there are differences of 
opinion regarding the challenges posed in making clinical evidence applicable, EBM fails to 
engage significantly with this problem. EBM’s penchant for methodological rigour may be 
at odds with the ad hoc nature of clinical practice. Tanenbaum has suggested that the 
precision of “best evidence” is fundamentally irreconcilable with its clinical relevance, given 
the particularity of patients and the significant improvisational dimensions of clinical 
practice (Tanenbaum, 1995). Shaughnessy et al. refer to this improvisational feature as 
“clinical jazz” (Shaughnessy et al., 1998). The debate over randomized controlled trials 
highlight that the problem of evidence in EBM does not only concern what knowledge is 
missing from the evidence based decisionmaking framework, but also the nature of the 
knowledge that does enter into consideration. 
4.3 Outcomes measures: Clinical effectiveness and the quality movement in medicine 
EBM was introduced to healthcare in the wake of what has been famously described as 
the “third revolution” in health care (Relman, 1988),4 a turn toward assessment and 
accountability in light of escalating health care costs creating a “crisis” situation in health 
care spending throughout the industrialized world. Patients and payers widely 
subscribed to a “waste theory” that described physicians wasting healthcare money on 
poorly performing diagnostics and treatments (Tanenbaum, 1994a). Furthermore, the 
documentation of notable geographical variations in practice that could not be explained 
by local organizational and financial arrangements caused alarm (Clancy & Eisenberg, 
1988). Health care advocates wanted the consistent practice of only the best health care 
interventions. The “best” was determined by the “end results” or “outcomes” of medical 
practice. The urgency with which the public demanded that physicians pay attention to 
medical outcomes led to what soon became known as the “outcomes movement” in health 
policy (Epstein, 1990). Evaluating clinical effectiveness was seen as a fiscally responsible 
means of only financing the most promising therapies and research. EBM facilitated the 
clinical data that outcomes research requires in order to evaluate best practices.  
Outcomes research refers to all activity directed towards the assessment of outcomes, 
analysis of effectiveness, and quality assurance (Epstein, 1990). It uses statistical analysis of 
clinical data to determine associations between particular therapeutic interventions and 
particular results (Tanenbaum, 1994a). Unlike laboratory research which measures definable 
clinical events like lipid lowering or blood pressure, outcomes research can employ patient-
derived endpoints, the outcomes that patients care about (Clancy & Eisenberg, 1988). 
Common themes in outcomes research are: safety, effectiveness, equity, efficiency, 
timeliness, and patient centeredness (Institute of Medicine, 2001). The benefits of outcomes 
research to healthcare include better informed patients and providers, the development of 
clinical guidelines that reflect those assessments, and wiser purchasing of health care 
technologies (Agency for Health Care Research and Quality, n.d.). This move towards 
                                                 
4 Relman later lamented that this “third revolution” was never realized due to lack of government 
initiative by any of the US governmental administrations elected since the 1988 writing of his editorial 
(Relman, 2009).  
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accountability is supposed to serve as a rational basis for decision making and, by extension, 
make medical care more efficient. 
The outcomes movement argues for the primacy of probabilistic knowledge derived from 
statistical studies for medical practice and the vigorous adoption of this position within health 
care indicates a radical shift in medical rationality (Tanenbaum, 1994a). Polychronis et al., for 
example, regard the ascendancy of EBM as the triumph of statistics over clinical common 
sense based on deterministic reasoning (Polychronis et al., 1996). Clinical epidemiology, the 
application of epidemiologic and biometric methods to direct patient care (Sackett, 1969), is 
now held by some to be a basic medical science (Sackett et al., 1991). EBM distinguishes itself 
from pre-evidence based biomedicine by its orientation toward outcomes research, while 
biomedicine is more dependent on bench science. Biomedical research employs laboratory 
science that aims to understand the causal relationship between an intervention and a desired 
effect, whereby therapeutic efficacy can then be inferred. EBM seeks to generate probabilistic 
knowledge regarding what is likely to work for whatever reason (Tanenbaum, 1994a). John 
Wennberg, director of the Centre for Evaluative Clinical Science at Dartmouth Medical School, 
regards biomedical science to be at the service of evaluative science in treatment 
decisionmaking. He argues that biomedicine generates new technologies, while evaluative 
science provides the crucial data linking treatments to outcomes (Wennberg, 1992).  
The consistent placement of the randomized controlled trial at the top of the EBM hierarchy of 
evidence is better understood in light of the biomedical versus evidence-based distinction, as 
this research method serves the objectives of outcomes research by appearing to bracket out a 
whole range of scientifically and epistemologically difficult questions about why treatments 
do or not work (Ashcroft, 2002). For instance, rather than determining the properties that 
enable or hinder an intervention’s success, randomized controlled trials establish efficacy by 
comparing the outcomes of the experimental arm with those found in a similar subject 
population receiving a comparator intervention. Eliminating bench science’s focus on 
determining why a treatment works or not through appeal to deeper biological theory has 
certain advantages for healthcare decision-making (Ashcroft 2002; Gifford 1996).5 Definitive 
biological explanation has not always led to safe or beneficial treatment of actual patients. The 
randomized trial “acts as a practical filter permitting the calibration of scientific good ideas 
against clinical reality (however that is constructed)” (Ashcroft, 2002). By comparing two or 
more competing courses of treatment (including placebo), the RCT “offers a technique for 
dispute resolution within medicine: where there is discord, let a trial be” (Ashcroft, 2002). 
Because EBM and outcomes research are closely allied, the concerns regarding the latter are 
similar to those launched against the former. The task of outcomes research, to solve the 
problems of quality and cost that beset the healthcare system and to do so by scientific 
rather than political means, raises the concern about the tenability of value-free measures 
(Goldenberg 2006). Furthermore, Tanenbaum’s account of the “epistemological politics” of 
the US outcomes movement (Tanenbaum, 1994a) brings into question whether this research 
can ever be so benign that it merely informs decision makers and helps them make better 
decisions (Sage, 1994). The championing of probabilistic knowledge to improve clinical 
practice is argued to replace subjective professional judgment with micromanagement by 
insurance companies and government (Tanenbaum 1993, 1995). 
                                                 
5 Of course there are several ways in which “does it work?” can be construed (Ashcroft et al., 1997).   
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While Tanenbaum is accused of pandering to the fears of physicians and other professionals 
who perceive outcomes research to be a threat to autonomous practice (Cangialose, 1994), 
her criticisms are not against outcomes research per se, as she recognizes the usefulness of 
statistical analysis in evaluating medical care. Her target is rather the outcomes movement, 
the “organized effort of one research community and its champions to gain special privilege 
for statistical evidence, to consider it the only true evidence of medical effectiveness, and to 
predicate an accountable health care system on physicians’ adherence to norms of practice 
derived from outcomes studies” (Tanenbaum, 1994b). Similar to EBM, the critics find utility 
in outcomes research for improving patient care, but they question its near-hegemonic 
status in influential health policy and administrative circles.  
5. Conclusion 
While this analysis dampens some of the hubris surrounding the evidence-based movement, 
it highlights the significant methodological innovation that EBM has brought to medicine. 
The evidence based approach is marked by the flourishing relationship that the evaluative 
sciences and informatics, once solely the domain of business and managerial studies, now 
have with medicine. Eliciting EBM’s place within the “quality movement” (Bodenheimer, 
1999) captures a shift in medical rationality and knowledge away from previous 
incarnations of biomedicine by way of EBM’s insistent epistemological privileging of 
standardized information over judgment, quantified measurement over experience, and 
epidemiology over bench science.  
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